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Though the Cold War never led to open hostilities between the United States of America and the 
Soviet Union, the two superpowers did engage in 
a seemingly endless series of wars by proxy in 
their struggle for dominance over international 
affairs. One of the major arenas was Central 
America, where regional politics influenced by 
ideologies led to decades of internal and external 
strife. Yet a glimmer of hope for peace emerged 
in the early 1980s even though acrimonious 
relations persisted between the US and USSR. 
Central and South American governments, with 
the encouragement of more distant nations, 
began a process of negotiation that eventually 
led to a reversal of the cycle violence.1 Canada 
played a leading role in providing substantial 
diplomatic and military assistance.2 It was not the 
first time that the country had assumed the role of 
impartial arbiter in international affairs. However, 
Canada’s political involvement and its subsequent 
participation in the Grupo de Observadores 
de la Naciones Unidas para Centro America 
(ONUCA) presented unique political and military 
challenges that foreshadowed the tremendous 
difficulties Canadian peacekeepers would face 
just a few years later in the Balkans.
Setting the Stage for Peace
Central America suffered from conflict throughout most of the Cold War as numerous 
militant factions wrestled for political, economic, 
and territorial control. Ongoing disputes between 
military juntas and leftist guerrillas destabilized 
the region, with ongoing wars in El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, and Guatemala being particularly 
violent. The growing crisis prompted several 
international leaders and activists to push for a 
resolution of the conflicts at the beginning of the 
1980s, expressing the fear that if the situation 
was allowed to deteriorate any further the Central 
American wars might seriously disrupt the 
western alliance.3
 In early 1983 the governments of Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela met at Isla 
Contadora just off the Panamanian coast 
to discuss options for an all-encompassing 
regional peace accord. It was a remote, but 
not inappropriate, location having previously 
come to international notice in 1979 as the 
temporary place of exile for the Shah of Iran. The 
participants produced a document of objectives, 
which included the promotion of democracy, 
the ending of armed conflict, improvements 
in compliance with international laws, and 
economic revitalization. In September 1983 the 
“Contadora Group” ratified the list at a signing 
ceremony in Panama City. 
 In 1984 the Contadora Group presented 
a second initiative named the Contadora Act 
on Peace and Cooperation in Central America. 
Though often considered a failure in Latin 
American political history, the act was an 
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6ambitious initiative aimed at the whole Central 
American region, and a watershed for the Inter-
American system and the United States-Latin 
American relationship. More important, it led to 
significant changes in the roles of both the United 
Nations and the Organization of American States 
(OAS) in Latin America, and planted the seeds for 
the notion of “zones of peace” across the western 
hemisphere and in particular, in areas of conflict 
in the Central American region.4
 The demise of the Contadora Act in late 1986 
resulted in a new initiative put forward by Costa 
Rican President Oscar Arias at a summit in 
February 1987 – “Una hora para la paz” [“A Time 
For Peace”]. The Arias peace proposal differed 
greatly from the Contadora Act in that there was 
a greater emphasis on internal democratisation 
and a reduced role for external actors. The plan 
retained the Contadora principle of disarmament 
and verification by a third party however, and 
requested that the secretary-general of the United 
Nations, the OAS, and the foreign ministers of 
the Contadora plan nations and support group 
countries form this oversight committee. It went 
against American policy towards Nicaragua by 
encouraging the disarmament of the Contras 
while simultaneously encouraging the Sandinista 
government to move towards a more democratic 
state. The White House would have preferred 
the Sandinistas make the first move, but, Arias 
correctly argued that a move towards peace 
required concurrent enforcement by all parties.
 Two attempts were made by the US in the 
summer of 1987 to sink the Arias proposal. 
The first, in July at Tegucigalpa, failed when 
Mexico prevented Honduras from replacing the 
Arias draft.5 The occasion of the second attempt 
to supersede Arias’ document, known as the 
“Reagan-Wright Plan,” was the Esquipulas meeting 
where the five Central American presidents 
planned to endorse Arias’ proposal. Arias had 
been forewarned of the American manoeuvre and 
was able to persuade his four colleagues to ratify 
his peace proposal on 7 August 1987.6
 With a formal agreement reached, the 
“Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm 
and Lasting Peace in Central America,” known 
both as the Esquipulas II Agreement and the 
Guatemala Procedure, came into effect. Designed 
initially to end hostilities between government 
forces and insurrectionist movements in the five 
Central American countries, the process grew 
to include several aspects of democratisation.7 
The Esquipulas II Agreement called for an 
immediate cease-fire, national reconciliation, 
amnesty, democratisation, an end to aiding 
insurgent movements, and free elections. While 
not fundamentally altering the structure of the 
Central American region it created a mutual 
confidence that ultimately allowed several peace 
building measures to move ahead. The key to 
ensuring the longevity of the peace agreement was 
the provision of an unbiased means of security 
and verification.
 Efforts to enforce Esquipulas II quickly 
stagnated. The International Commission for 
Verification and Follow-up (CIVS - Comisión 
Internacional de Verificación y Seguimiento) 
formed to enforce the agreement, met with 
considerable difficulties in the field. Both its 
mandate and authority were never fully clarified, 
a basic error considering that the CIVS was 
expected to determine the most appropriate 
verification organization and operations.8 The 
CIVS membership of South American and other 
neutral parties to counter US challenges to its 
legitimacy, moreover, suggested to the Central 
American states that outsiders were dictating 
their future. Worse still, the activities of the 
CIVS appeared to be partial towards groups 
opposing the Central American governments, 
and this perceived favouritism quickly led to 
the commission’s demise. The report filed by 
the CIVS in January 1988 heavily criticised the 
governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras. Unsurprisingly, the Central American 
governments (with the exception of Nicaragua 
which had received relatively little criticism) 
dismissed the report outright and politely but 
swiftly shut down the CIVS.9
 It was well over a year before another 
attempt at verification of Esquipulas II was 
made. In the meantime, fighting broke out once 
more along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border 
between Sandinista forces and Contras, further 
jeopardizing the conditions for peace. In April 
1988 a meeting of the Esquipulas Executive 
Commission (consisting of the Central American 
foreign ministers) resulted in the creation of a 
Technical Advisory Group (TAG), made up of 
Canada, Spain, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
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8and Venezuela. The TAG set the parameters for 
the verification of the peace process and was in 
essence the predecessor and catalyst of ONUCA, 
and those involved in the former eventually 
became the core of the latter.10
 With the conditions for peace in place, the OAS 
and the UN were requested to provide both civilian 
and military elements to monitor and verify the 
fulfilment of the commitments contained in the 
Esquipulas II agreement.11 ONUCA, 
the first UN military mission to the 
region, was established by the UN 
Security Council in November 1989. 
Though the conditions for peace in 
Central America were favourable, 
Canadian presence and leadership 
in ONUCA at both the political and 
military level became instrumental 
in ensuring the success of the entire 
process.
Implementation of the 
Peace Plan
The Contadora Act negotiations of the early 1980s coincided 
with a renewed interest in the 
region by Canada. Influenced by 
a variety of Canadian public and 
private interest groups, the House 
of Commons Standing Committee 
on External Affairs and National 
Defence (SCEAND) published 
a major report in 1982 entitled 
Canada’s Relations With Latin 
America and the Caribbean.12 
The document recommended a 
higher priority for the whole region 
in Canadian foreign policy and a 
conference of representatives of all 
the states in the Americas to discuss 
security issues in the Caribbean and 
Central America. It was the first step 
in an increased Canadian political interest in the 
region, after decades of aloofness.13
 Despite a desire to increase Canadian 
influence, Ottawa had to be mindful of potential 
confrontations with the United States. While 
Washington argued that the Central American 
conflict was the result of an export of revolution 
by a Moscow-Havana axis, Canada generally 
believed that the root cause lay in historical 
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Equipment arrives in-country to support 
Canada’s contribution to ONUCA:
Left: A Canadian Forces truck, pre-painted 
in UN white, rolls off a ship after the voyage 
from Canada.
Below: CF ground crew unpacking a newly-
arrived Canadian Jet Ranger helicopter at 
Tegucigalpa Airport, Honduras.
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9socio-economic problems.14 The 
1982 SCEAND report had neither 
recommended that Canada consider 
membership in the Organization of 
American States (OAS) nor add its 
signature to the Rio Pact. However, 
the report clearly indicated that 
Canadian presence in Latin American 
affairs should be increased in the 
interests of a multi-lateral resolution 
of the conflicts.15
 At the UN General Assembly 
in September 1983, Canadian 
Secretary for External Affairs Allan 
MacEachen supported Contadora 
and offered Canadian political 
support to any successful peace 
agreement. From October 1983 
Canada became directly involved in 
advising all parties in the Central 
American peace negotiations, and 
made a particular contribution 
towards the design of the Control 
and Verification Commission in 
the various Contadora Act drafts.16 
In mid-1984 Mexico, which was 
traditionally suspicious of large 
peacekeeping forces, rejected the 
idea of a Canadian peacekeeping 
deployment, but Ottawa continued 
to examine how it might bring its 
extensive peacekeeping experience 
to bear on the region.17 
 Ironically, Canada’s political 
absence from the region since the end of the 
Second World War allowed Ottawa to appear as a 
neutral actor, thus adding a degree of legitimacy 
to the peace negotiations. Canada reinforced 
its position by rejecting American pressure to 
favour El Salvador over Nicaragua in diplomatic 
communications. Canada had no desire to 
support the US vision of Central America as an 
East-West crisis.18 Equally important, Canada 
was perhaps the best choice for mediation and 
assistance because of the country’s experience 
in UN-mandated operations in Asia, Africa, and 
the Middle East. Overall, Canada was not only 
a favourable candidate but also perhaps the 
only legitimate option available for successfully 
advancing the peacekeeping process in Central 
America.19
 Canadian military involvement in the Central 
American peace process increased considerably 
as the United Nations became more involved in 
the Esquipulas II mandate. On 7 October 1987, 
the UN General Assembly published a resolution 
expressing complete support for the Esquipulas 
II agreement and requested the Secretary General 
to afford the fullest assistance of the UN towards 
C
FJ
IC
 IX
C
90
-7
3
C
FJ
IC
 IX
C
90
-5
6
Right: CF personnel unload a Hercules 
transport aircraft.
Below: A UN observer group patrols their 
assigned area.
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the Central American peace effort.20 The following 
month the Canadian minister of External Affairs, 
Joe Clark, visited Central America, after which 
he stated that Canada was prepared to commit 
resources for part of or all the work required to 
bring the Esquipulas II agreement to fruition. 
There was then little doubt that Canada would 
be involved with any peacekeeping deployment 
to the region.
 ONUCA was designed to concentrate in those 
areas where activities contrary to the security 
undertakings in the Esquipulas II Agreement 
were alleged to occur. Of particular concern 
were the borders between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, between Honduras and Nicaragua, 
between Honduras and El Salvador, and between 
Guatemala and El Salvador. Also the regions 
of northeastern Nicaragua and southwestern 
Honduras required close attention. When a 
complaint was registered with ONUCA, the 
mission would contact the government that 
was the subject of the complaint and ask for 
full cooperation in investigating the matter. 
The results of the investigation would then be 
transmitted to both governments concerned.21
 Planning envisaged four phases for the 
ONUCA mission. In the first phase, following 
the approval by the UN Security Council to 
deploy ONUCA, an advance party of 30 military 
officers and civilian support staff led by the Chief 
Military Observer (CMO) would establish an 
operational headquarters (HQ) at Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras. In the second phase an additional 
70 observers, five helicopters, and naval vessels 
would be deployed to ONUCA HQ, the liaison 
offices, and the verification centres. During this 
phase of the mission ONUCA would establish the 
ability to investigate complaints submitted by any 
government, and to conduct limited patrolling 
of the conflict areas. During the third phase of 
the mission, to be completed no later than three 
months after the arrival of the advance party, 
a further 63 observers would be deployed in 
nine more verification centres supported by an 
additional four helicopters. The new verification 
centres were to be deployed in strategic areas along 
the border where patrolling could be undertaken 
without major logistical requirements. The timing 
of the last phase of the mission would depend 
on the progress and results achieved in the 
previous phases and would see the deployment 
of another 98 observers and three helicopters 
at 14 new verification centres. This last phase 
would bring the total to 33 verification centres 
and 260 military observers,22 enough, it was 
expected, to undertake patrolling of the entire 
Central American region.23
 In November 1987, the Department of 
National Defence (DND) dispatched two senior 
officers with the minister of External Affairs 
on his visit to Central America to conduct 
a detailed mission analysis to assess the 
proposed concept of operations. One of the two 
officers was Lieutenant-Colonel Don Ethell, a 
Canadian soldier with considerable peacekeeping 
experience. Lieutenant-Colonel Ethell produced a 
comprehensive report highlighting the difficulties 
of terrain, financial and logistical challenges, and, 
most important, the requirement for a clearly 
defined mandate and terms of reference prior 
to the deployment of any military personnel.24 
Both DND and the Department of External 
Affairs (DEA) felt that while there was a general 
consensus amongst the Central American leaders 
on the idea of peace, there was a reluctance to 
define clearly the details of that peace. Yet the 
devil of complex peacekeeping was in the details, 
and Canadian soldiers, unarmed and acting only 
as observers, had no desire to find themselves 
ill-equipped to face disputes that were sure to 
arise. DEA concurred and demanded clarity 
from the regional actors. Joe Clark argued in 
the House of Commons, “That kind of vagueness 
was useful in getting agreement on the peace plan 
in the first place, but it is not good enough now. 
The regional presidents should be encouraged 
as loudly as possible to decide what they mean 
by peace, and just exactly how they propose to 
go about maintaining it.”25
 A number of technical considerations about 
the proposed military mission also had to be 
considered. The nature of the terrain presented 
numerous challenges. Complex hills, peaks, and 
valleys hidden under layers of jungle canopy 
meant that area coverage would be difficult at 
best, as would the detection and discrimination 
of various groups moving throughout the region. 
DND concluded that any UN mission would 
require either large-scale forces stationed all 
across the region at key points, or a smaller, 
highly mobile force that could readily move 
between key points. As well, the success of the 
mission depended upon accurate and timely 
reporting, but again the terrain of some of the 
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states made some communications very difficult 
and others impossible. DND concluded that a 
peacekeeping mission in Central America would 
be impossible without considerable political and 
technical support for the deployments.26 Given 
the state of the Canadian Forces (CF) in 1989, 
any involvement of its troops in theatre would be 
dependent on additional assets or support to be 
successful.
 Both the political and the military assessments 
of ONUCA’s mandate were indicative of the change 
then underway in UN missions in general. 
Traditionally, UN missions were based upon the 
principles set down in 1958, where forces were 
deployed with the consent of all parties and 
remained strictly impartial. The primary roles 
of soldiers on the ground were to defuse tension, 
stabilize situations, and arbitrate disputes. Such 
missions were generally achievable despite the 
division of the Security Council during the Cold 
War. With a foreseeable end to the East-West 
struggle, however, the UN felt the chains of 
inertia were removed from the Security Council 
as it made the transition from competition to 
cooperation. A renewed sense of internationalism 
was also giving the UN a moral imperative to 
intervene where intra-state disorder and massive 
human rights abuses and suffering were taking 
place. UN missions at the end of the 1980s 
therefore contained elements not previously 
encountered, such as ONUCA’s mandate to 
demobilize and disarm guerrilla armies as well 
as stabilize internal groupings and contribute to 
humanitarian aid and security.
The Canadian Deployment
Little effort was made in the Canadian Forces to prepare specifically for the ONUCA mission 
following the strategic reconnaissance conducted 
A CF Hercules on ﬁnal approach to a Central American airﬁeld.
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in November 1987, and any number of factors 
may have contributed to this inactivity. While at 
the political level Canada was becoming deeply 
involved in Central America, the government was 
launching a revised defence policy that refocused 
attention on West European collective security. In 
June 1987, only two months before Esquipulas 
II was signed, the Canadian government tabled 
Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy 
for Canada, replacing the 1971 White Paper 
on defence. Challenge and Commitment 
considerably altered the previous Canadian 
defence policy, which had been described as 
overly optimistic in its assessment of future 
international relations, and detrimental to 
conventional force development as a deterrent 
to Soviet aggression.27 Since 1971 the Canadian 
Forces had evolved, but not as the integrated 
force under centralized operational command 
that Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer 
had envisioned when he led the restructuring 
of the armed forces in the 1960s. The land, sea 
and air elements of the unified forces continued 
to operate as distinct services in important yet 
largely separate activities in support of national 
defence, and the 1987 White Paper reinforced 
those separate, loosely linked roles.
 Contingency planning for missions at National 
Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) was usually 
staffed in an ad hoc manner. Although studies 
were underway to improve joint operational 
staffing and planning, an organization specifically 
responsible for such activities in Ottawa did not 
appear until July 1990.28 Therefore missions 
like ONUCA did not receive the direct attention 
of any particular military staff unless they were 
specifically ordered to do so. DND and the 
CF were later criticized for being ill prepared 
for ONUCA when an official announcement of 
Canadian participation arrived at NDHQ in 
December 1989, but such complaints were 
misguided.29 The 1987 White Paper directed that 
Canada would not undertake any peacekeeping 
mission if “participation will jeopardise other 
commitments…and whether participation is 
adequately and equitably funded and logistically 
supported.”30 Helicopters were to be a main 
component of the Central American operation, 
yet Canada had just committed a significant 
portion of its operational fleet. In 1986 Canada 
began participating in the Multinational Force and 
Observers (MFO) in the Middle East, replacing 
the Australian-New Zealand helicopter unit 
with assets from the Canadian Forces’ No.408 
Captain Steve France, Royal Canadian Regiment (right), discusses the situation at the Honduran/Nicaraguan
border with Second Lieutenant Jose Martinez (left) of the Honduran Army and another unidentiﬁed UN ofﬁcer.
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Squadron.31 As well, the established policy for 
Canada was to have two thousand CF members 
available for peacekeeping at any one time. 
In 1989-90 Canada had approximately 1,100 
members already deployed.32
 The ONUCA mission, moreover, still waited 
on the unanimous consent of five states that 
traditionally mistrusted one another, and then 
confirmation by Ottawa. Extensive pre-planning 
by DND seemed unrealistic given its other 
numerous tasks.33 Previous experience had 
demonstrated that the government was quick to 
change decisions with respect to UN missions, 
and in other cases Canadian intentions were 
simply superseded by events. NDHQ staffs 
were already stretched and widely committed, 
and there is nothing to suggest that the ONUCA 
mission received any less attention than other 
contingency operations under consideration at 
that time.
 Even though the final decision to commit 
Canadian military resources to ONUCA had yet 
to be made, DND was directed by the government 
to attach three officers to a reconnaissance team 
to the region led by Brigadier-General Péricles 
Ferreira Gomes of Brazil in September 1989.34 
Brigadier-General Gomes had previously been 
Chief Military Observer (CMO) of the United 
Nations Angola Verification Mission, and was 
very experienced in missions with mandates 
similar to that of the ONUCA operation. Following 
the completion of this reconnaissance and 
Gomes’ report to the UN secretary-general, the 
deployment of ONUCA came to the UN Security 
Council.35 On 7 November 1989, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 644 (1989), approving 
the deployment of military peacekeepers to the 
region. Canada agreed in principle to contribute 
about 40 military observers as well as up to 
100 helicopter aircrew and eight CH-139 Jet 
Ranger helicopters. Three weeks later in Ottawa, 
Brigadier-General Ian C. Douglas was notified 
that OPERATION SULTAN (Canada’s designation 
for the ONUCA deployment) had begun, and that 
he was to become ONUCA’s chief of staff (COS) as 
well as commander of the Canadian contingent. 
Major Claude Guerin was to be Douglas’ deputy 
commanding officer (DCO). Another senior 
Canadian officer, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Morris, 
was appointed senior staff officer air operations 
at ONUCA HQ.36 In total nine CF members were 
tasked to deploy with the advance party on 
3 December, with an additional 12 members 
augmenting the advance party on 4 January 
1990.37 The total lead contingent numbered 
approximately 30 military officers, 13 medical 
staff, and three pilots. This group established the 
ONUCA HQ in the offices of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) in Tegucigalpa, 
the Honduran capital.
Major Rene Gervais (centre) of Canada and Captain Ricardo Illan (right) of Spain, tour the Honduran/Nicaraguan
border crossing point at El Guasaule, accompanied by Lieutenant Ramirez of the Honduran Army.
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 Brigadier-General Douglas had a wide range 
of command responsibilities, including ensuring 
that liaison offices were established in the capitals 
of all five countries and that the necessary 
arrangements were made for the establishment 
of the first group of verification centres. As well, 
accommodations at the Tegucigalpa Airport had 
to be prepared for the arrival of Canada’s 89 
Rotary Air Wing Unit [89 (Cdn) RWAU] as well 
as a Dornier 228-200 light aircraft arriving from 
Germany. All of this was accomplished without 
incident.38
Mission Evolution
The ONUCA advance party was immediately faced with unexpected challenges. Setting up 
in Guatemala and Costa Rica was sluggish for 
many reasons, and ONUCA was unable to establish 
any liaison or verification centres in El Salvador 
until mid January 1990. Much more troubling, 
just as the UN Security Council was about to 
approve Resolution 644 creating ONUCA, failed 
negotiations between the Salvadoran government 
and the left-wing Frente Farabundo Martí para 
la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) led to open 
violence. On 31 October 1989, the FMLN bombed 
a Salvadoran Trade Union building killing ten 
people and wounding 20 others. The FMLN 
then announced its cessation of negotiations 
with the government and launched a major 
offensive two weeks later. Salvadoran President 
Alfredo Cristiani declared a state of emergency, 
and within days both sides had suffered 
over two thousand casualties in continuous 
fighting around the capital city.39 The crash of 
a Nicaraguan aircraft laden with missiles and 
other arms in El Salvador on 25 November 1989 
did little to ease political and military tensions. 
The Cristiani government accused Nicaragua of 
supplying the FMLN with arms and immediately 
suspended diplomatic and economic ties with the 
country. This in turn led to an announcement by 
the UN and OAS on 5 December, two days after 
the ONUCA advance team had arrived, that plans 
for the demobilisation of the Contras by the end 
of 1989 were no longer possible. The situation 
remained fluid as more UN peacekeepers and 
their equipment arrived.
Major Claude Guerin, DCO of the Canadian ONUCA contingent, and Major Peter Abbott, maintenance
ofﬁcer, discuss local security with a Honduran policeman near the Danli Veriﬁcation Centre.
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 The FMLN offensive brought immediate 
political reaction from Ottawa. On 22 November, 
Michael Jay, the Central American programme 
officer for the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), announced that the Canadian 
government’s bilateral aid programme for El 
Salvador had been temporarily halted. The 
programme consisted of over a hundred separate 
projects, many of which were perceived as only 
assisting the El Salvadoran government in freeing 
its own funds for military purposes.40 Canadian 
immigration officers in El Salvador issued 100 
emergency minister’s permits to Salvadorans for 
reunification with their families in Canada, and 
ran an emergency airlift that rescued about three 
hundred Salvadoran refugees from the raging 
civil war.41 These were effective measures and 
served as a tangible demonstration of the two-tier 
political/military approach Ottawa had taken to 
encourage peace in the region.
 To help reduce sporadic violence in the 
region, ONUCA’s mandate was expanded on 12 
December to include the verification and cessation 
of hostilities as well as the demobilisation of 
irregular forces that might be agreed upon in 
the region.42 For the UN military observers 
(UNMO) on the ground this meant more work, 
but also the opportunity to achieve a lasting 
effect. It was hoped that ONUCA could disband 
Contra bases along the Honduran-Nicaraguan 
border, and assist with the demobilisation of the 
FMLN in El Salvador. During the next two weeks 
ONUCA established 13 verification centres, each 
garrisoned with up to ten UNMOs. Canadian 
soldiers and aircrew were issued with jungle 
survival kits and other necessary gear, while the 
Jet Ranger helicopters were repainted, given 
UN aircraft markings, and fitted with special 
communications equipment, distance measuring 
equipment, and infrared suppression kits. The 
last item was a wise precaution because even with 
UN markings the ONUCA helicopters might be 
perceived as a threat, accidentally or otherwise. 
The suppression kits provided some protection 
against the heat-seeking surface-to-air (SAM) 
missiles that the FMLN guerrillas and Contras 
were believed to still have in their arsenals.43
 Once in place, Canadian and other ONUCA 
UNMOs immediately made their presence 
and mission known to the local organizations 
and populations. This was no small task, as 
a single operational post could be responsible 
for patrolling over a hundred kilometres of 
complex terrain. UNMOs conducted daily patrols 
of their areas of responsibility by land, air, and 
even occasionally by river. Remote posts were 
often inaccessible by road, which in turn made 
the Canadian helicopters indispensable.44 UN 
observers at Las Trojes, Honduras, for example, 
were responsible for a 110 kilometre section of 
the Honduran-Nicaraguan border that included 
the major Contra bases as well as three refugee 
camps.45 The post also required all of its supplies 
to be airlifted in, as there was neither food nor 
accommodations in situ to support the observer 
teams.
 Throughout January 1990 the conditions 
around El Salvador improved only slightly. 
The FMLN had been encouraged to return to 
An ONUCA helicopter detachment including Canadian Jet Rangers sets off on a border patrol.
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negotiations with the Cristiani government, 
allowing the ONUCA liaison office to finally 
be established in San Salvador. However, the 
prevailing security conditions greatly restricted 
what observers could do and where they could 
go, which made demobilisation of the FMLN 
extremely difficult. As the year dragged on 
negotiation crumbled once more, and eventually 
the El Salvador situation merited its own separate 
UN mission the following year.46
 The challenges facing ONUCA continually 
increased as the mission went on. With the 
exception of El Salvador, phase two of ONUCA 
began on schedule with the establishment of 
Verification Centres (VCs), and was completed by 
18 January 1990. Additional Canadian material 
and personnel arrived in theatre that same week, 
augmenting the Canadian contingent’s strength 
to 122 personnel and four helicopters.47 The 
third phase of ONUCA (19 January to 4 March 
1990) proved more difficult to complete. Some 
of the countries that initially committed to deploy 
troops found themselves unable or unwilling to 
provide all of the military observers required. 
This in turn affected ONUCA’s ability to effectively 
patrol trouble spots making an arduous task even 
more difficult. Colonel John D. Joly, a senior 
Canadian officer who commanded Observer 
Group El Salvador (OGELS), noted in 1991 
that ONUCA, “has neither the authority nor the 
capacity to prevent, by physical means, either 
the movement of armed persons or war-like 
material across borders or other violations.”48 
He added, “in practice it quickly became clear 
that ONUCA’s capacity was very limited…an 
international peace-keeping operation simply 
cannot undertake the detection of clandestine 
activities without assuming functions that 
properly belong to the security forces of the 
country or countries concerned.”49
 It proved difficult to find the four fast patrol 
boats needed to monitor the Gulf of Fonseca. 
Eventually, Argentina supplied the vessels and 
some crew with the remainder being made up 
once more by Canada.50 Based at San Lorenzo, 
Honduras, the naval verification centre carried 
out daily patrols in the gulf and its approaches 
to the Pacific Ocean. Naval personnel observed 
and recorded patterns of maritime traffic so 
they could identify anything out of character. 
Additionally, Canadian naval observers made 
regular visits to naval bases maintained in or 
near the Gulf of Fonseca.51
Demobilization and Transition
Despite the slow and at times painful steps taken towards peace, Canada believed 
that progress could be made with ONUCA. 
Fortunately, ONUCA’s mandate was assisted 
by the rapid transition in East-West relations 
in 1990 that signalled the end of the Cold War. 
The drastic reduction in military and financial 
assistance from both Moscow and Washington to 
Central America weakened all factions and also 
encouraged the transition towards a peaceful 
settlement. On 9 February 1990, Minister of 
National Defence Bill McKnight announced in 
the House of Commons that, “in the case of 
Central America the level of risk is manageable, 
and is justified by the importance we attach to 
the process of advancing peace in the region.”52 
Ottawa clearly sensed there was an opportunity 
to complete the mission successfully, and in turn 
augmented its troop commitment to ONUCA 
the following month. All five Central American 
governments perceived the additional Canadian 
support as a sign of good faith that demobilization 
and democratisation was possible.53
 On 25 February the National Opposition 
Union (UNO) coalition headed by Mrs. Violeta 
Chamorro defeated President Daniel Ortega of the 
incumbent Sandinista government in a surprising 
upset. The Contras were jubilant over the results, 
and indicated their desire to disband as the 
conflict was now over. While some Contra leaders 
were hesitant to give up their arms, the end of 
American financial aid to their cause soon left the 
Contras with few resources to continue. As well, a 
large portion of Sandinista support had dissolved 
in the wake of the election, leaving Chamorro’s 
UNO party the opportunity to demilitarise a large 
portion of Central America and establish a zone 
of peace.54
 The demobilization of Contras required 
considerably more manpower than ONUCA could 
bring to bear and the unarmed UNMOs could not 
forcibly disarm anyone. Throughout this period 
General Douglas worked closely with all elements, 
achieving considerable success in implementing 
confidence-building measures. However, he was 
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frustrated by the lack of resources available to 
complete the task at hand. On 15 March the 
UN Security Council decided that additional air 
and land power would be required to effect the 
demobilisation and repatriation of the Contras 
and Sandinistas. UN Security Resolution 650 
(1990) was passed the following week, enlarging 
the ONUCA mandate to include demobilisation 
operations and authorising the increase of 
the mission strength with armed personnel. 
Venezuela, who already had UNMOs with ONUCA, 
provided a paratrooper battalion to supervise 
ground operations while Canada lent additional 
air support. On 22 March Ottawa announced 
that it was dispatching further pilots and support 
personnel, and augmenting the Canadian air 
element with an additional four Twin Huey 
helicopters.55 The additional commitment raised 
the strength of the Canadian contingent to 169 
all ranks.
 The demobilization of all groups began in 
April 1990 and was largely completed by the end 
of July. On the night of 18-19 April, all Nicaraguan 
parties agreed to a series of arrangements that 
included an immediate cease-fire and separation 
of forces. Canadian soldiers were involved at 
all levels and in every area. General Douglas, 
who had been with ONUCA since the beginning, 
oversaw many of the weapon turn-ins and 
arranged for their proper disposal by the UN. 
What at first seemed unlikely in Central America 
had quickly turned into reality and the Canadian 
contingent had played a major role in providing 
the conditions to make peace possible. Scheduled 
to return to Canada soon after the demobilisation 
of Nicaragua had been completed, General 
Douglas had considered Canada’s contribution 
to ONUCA thus far most influential and satisfying 
towards achieving peace.56
 The process of seeking Douglas’ successor 
began in April 1990. An offer by Brigadier-
General Lewis W. Mackenzie to succeed him 
was originally denied by NDHQ, who then later 
reversed its decision and assigned him to take 
over the Canadian contingent. General Mackenzie 
reported to Ottawa in late April and received a 
two-week crash course in Spanish before heading 
to UN headquarters in June 1990 for further 
briefings. On 7 August 1990, General Mackenzie 
arrived in Tegucigalpa to complete his hand over 
from General Douglas.57
 General Mackenzie was immediately faced 
with the challenge of determining the necessity of 
ONUCA’s continued presence. General Douglas’ 
success with the demobilization of the Contras 
had been so effective many were wondering if 
there was any further need for ONUCA now that 
the largest force that had destabilized the region 
had been subdued. As well, just days before his 
arrival Iraq invaded its smaller neighbour Kuwait, 
and Ottawa’s attention immediately refocused 
towards this latest international crisis. General 
Mackenzie, on Ottawa’s orders, substantially 
The Canadian ONUCA Contingent.
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reduced Canada’s ONUCA contingent (with 
General Gomez’ approval) to reflect both the 
decreased activity of the mission as well as a 
potential new demand for forces in the Persian 
Gulf.58
 With little need to continue patrolling of 
remote border areas, most of Canada’s air 
contingent returned home at the end of August 
1990. Captain William Callaghan, the Adjutant of 
89 (Cdn) RWAU, noted that his unit had, “played 
a major role in bringing the demobilisation of the 
Nicaraguan resistance movement to a successful 
conclusion.”59
 The reduction of the overall ONUCA 
deployment strength and the return of General 
Gomez to Spain left General Mackenzie as acting 
commander of the mission in December 1990. 
Canada’s contingent had been reduced to about 
only 30 personnel, most having returned to their 
units in Canada or to fill positions vacated by 
Canadian Forces officers who deployed to the 
Persian Gulf. In March 1991, Canada dispatched 
eight observers to assist in the monitoring of 
municipal and legislative elections in El Salvador, 
but made no increases to its ONUCA contingent. 
General Mackenzie commanded ONUCA until 17 
May 1991, when he handed the mission over to 
Brigadier-General Victor Suanez Pardo of Spain. 
General Pardo commanded ONUCA until its 
conclusion the following year.
Conclusion
The Central American peace process took more than a decade to become effective. 
Canada was involved in the process nearly from 
the outset, contributing political and then military 
assistance. At both levels Canada acted as a force 
of reason. Ottawa’s involvement at the political 
level was invaluable. Canadian presence and 
assistance in negotiations offset the traditional 
hemispheric hegemony of the United States, 
adding legitimacy because of the country’s 
dispassionate credibility to Central American 
initiatives for peace. Canada’s involvement at 
the military level ensured that experience and 
professionalism would characterise the ONUCA 
mission that was expected to carry out the 
complex mandate stipulated in the Esquipulas 
II Agreement. However, the willingness of the 
five Central American governments and their 
non-state actors to participate in the process 
ultimately ensured its success. 
 For the Canadian military many valuable 
lessons were learned from ONUCA. First and 
perhaps most important, ONUCA foreshadowed 
the ‘new’ peacekeeping of the 1990s where 
mandates became increasingly complex and 
peacekeeping itself became more dangerous. 
Robust leadership, command, and control 
was needed for success but at times military 
personnel on the ground found such support 
wanting. For example, while satisfied with the 
continuous political support from Ottawa and 
generally clear lines of communications with 
NDHQ, General Mackenzie later complained 
that his greatest frustrations instead were with 
the slow and complex decision-making system 
at UN headquarters in New York.60 It was a 
nightmare that would that would be repeated in 
the Balkans.
 The mission also revealed the capability 
gaps that existed within a Canadian military still 
oriented towards fighting a Euro-centric Third 
World War. Strategic command and control at 
NDHQ was improving, but missions such as 
ONUCA, the UN Transition Assistance Group 
to Namibia (UNTAG), and the United Nations 
Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), 
as well as missions such as Operation BANDIT 
(Haiti) during 1987-88, the Oka Crisis in 1990, 
and the Gulf War in 1990-91, all stressed the need 
for the creation of a strategic level joint operational 
staff as soon as possible. Operationally, force 
generation and force employment were showing 
stress, especially with the requirement to sustain 
a number of missions simultaneously across the 
globe. In 1990-91 CF elements were deployed in 
Central America, but they were also in Germany, 
the Gulf, the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle 
East. These deployments had a tremendous effect 
on both personnel and force structures, both of 
which were already stressed as a result of the 
government’s military reductions in its search 
for a Cold War peace dividend.
 Despite these deficiencies there was little that 
could be done at the time. In February 1992, just 
as the Canadian ONUCA mission was concluding, 
the Federal government tabled a new budget that 
included significant cuts to the military. The 
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commitment to leave the Standing Task Force in 
Europe was cancelled, and the 1,100 positions 
planned for that force were simply eliminated. 
The regular force component was further 
reduced, and the intended growth of the Army 
Reserve delayed.61 Lieutenant-General Gervais, 
the Commander of the Army at the time, stated 
bluntly that the “demands for a peace dividend 
have created new realities in defence funding. 
They are reflected in restricted Regular Force 
manning levels, infrastructure rationalization, 
and tighter budgets for all resource managers. 
These factors are necessitating changes in the 
Army structure.”62
 Operations in complex terrain against 
elusive adversaries and targets demanded state 
of the art resources, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures. The CF had neither the mandate 
nor the resources adequately to focus on such 
requirements even though it was being committed 
to increasingly complex UN missions that 
required such capabilities. As well, the military 
was stretched thin by ongoing deployments 
and had no spares or reinforcements readily 
at hand; had something gone seriously wrong 
in Central America the Canadians may have 
had to withdraw from the mission. This would 
have  had serious consequences for the CF, but 
also for Canadian foreign policy as a whole. It is 
therefore a testament to the quality of the men 
and women of the Canadian Forces who served 
with ONUCA that the mission was a success. 
That success gave a boost to the credibility of 
Canadian foreign policy because the country was 
able to play a positive role in the peace process 
in Central America at the end of the Cold War.
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